PAULA CORBIN JONES,

   Plaintiff,

   vs. No. LR-C-94-290

   WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
   and DANNY FERGUSON,

   Defendants.

           MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
   The plaintiff in this lawsuit, Paula Corbin Jones, seeks civil damages
   from William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and
   Danny Ferguson, a former Arkansas State Police Officer, for alleged
   actions beginning with an incident in a hotel suite in Little Rock,
   Arkansas. This case was previously before the Supreme Court of the
   United States to resolve the issue of Presidential immunity but was
   remanded to this Court following the Supreme Court's determination that
   there is no constitutional impediment to allowing plaintiff's case to
   proceed while the President is in office. See Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct.
   1636 (1997). Following remand, the President filed a motion for
   judgment on the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(c) of
   pleadings and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ferguson joined in
   the President's motion. By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated
   August 22, 1997, this Court granted in part and denied in part the
   President's motion. See Jones v. Clinton, 974 F.Supp. 712 (E.D.Ark.
   1997). The Court dismissed plaintiffs defamation claim against the
   President, dismissed her due process claim for deprivation of a property
   interest in her State employment, and dismissed her due process claims
   for deprivation of a liberty interest based on false imprisonment and
   injury to reputation, but concluded that the remaining claims in plaintiff's
   complaint stated viable causes of action. See id. Plaintiff subsequently
   obtained new counsel and filed a motion for leave to file a first amended
   complaint, which the Court granted, albeit with several qualifications.
   See Order of November 24, 1997.1 The matter is now before the Court
   on motion of both the President and Ferguson for summary judgment
   pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has
   responded in opposition to these motions, and the President and
   Ferguson have each filed a reply to plaintiff's response to their motions.
   For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the President's and
   Ferguson's motions for summary judgment should both be and hereby
   are granted.2

                          I.

   This lawsuit is based on an incident that is said to have taken place on
   the afternoon of May 8, 1991, in a suite at the Excelsior Hotel in Little
   Rock, Arkansas. President Clinton was Governor of the State of
   Arkansas at the time, and plaintiff was a State employee with the
   Arkansas Industrial Development Commission ("AIDC"), having begun
   her State employment on March 11, 1991. Ferguson was an Arkansas
   State Police officer assigned to the Governor's security detail.

   According to the record, then-Governor Clinton was at the Excelsior
   Hotel on the day in question delivering a speech at an official conference
   being sponsored by the AIDC. Am. Compl. Paragraph 7.3 Plaintiff states
   that she and another AIDC employee, Pamela Blackard, were working at
   a registration desk for the AIDC when a man approached the desk and
   informed her and Blackard that he was Trooper Danny Ferguson, the
   Governor's bodyguard. Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraphs 1-2.
   She states that Ferguson made small talk with her and Blackard and that
   they asked him if he had a gun as he was in street clothes and they
   'wanted to know." Pl.'s Depo. at 101. Ferguson acknowledged that he
   did and, after being asked to show the gun to them, left the registration
   desk to return to the Governor. Id.; Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts,
   Paragraph 2. The conversation between plaintiff, Blackard, and
   Ferguson lasted approximately five minutes and consisted of light,
   friendly banter; there was nothing intimidating, threatening, or coercive
   about it. Pl.'s Depo. at 226-27.

   Upon leaving the registration desk, Ferguson apparently had a
   conversation with the Governor about the possibility of meeting with
   plaintiff, during which Ferguson states the Governor remarked that
   plaintiff had "that come-hither look," i.e. "a sort of [sexually] suggestive
   appearance from the look or dress." Ferguson Depo. at 50; PI. 's
   Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph 3; President's Depo. at 109.4 He
   states that "some time later" the Governor asked him to "get him a room,
   that he was expecting a call from the White House and ... had several
   phone calls that he needed to make," and asked him to go to the car and
   get his briefcase containing the phone messages. Ferguson Depo. at 50,
   67. Ferguson states that upon obtaining the room, the Governor told him
   that if plaintiff wanted to meet him, she could "come up." Id. at 50.

   Plaintiff states that Ferguson later reappeared at the registration desk,
   delivered a piece of paper to her with a four-digit number written on it,
   and said that the Governor would like to meet with her in this suite
   number. PI. "s Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph 6. She states that
   she, Blackard, and Ferguson talked about what the Governor could want
   and that Ferguson stated, among other things, "We do this all the time."
   Id. Thinking that it was an honor to be asked to meet the Governor and
   that it might lead to an enhanced employment opportunity, plaintiff states
   that she agreed to the meeting and that Ferguson escorted her to the
   floor of the hotel upon which the Governor's suite was located. Am.
   Compl. Paragraphs 11-13.

   Plaintiff states that upon arriving at the suite and announcing herself, the
   Governor shook her hand, invited her in, and closed the door. Pl.'s
   Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraphs 7-8. She states that a few minutes
   of small talk ensued, which included the Governor asking her about her
   job and him mentioning that Dave Harrington, plaintiff's ultimate
   superior within the AIDC and a Clinton appointee, was his "good friend."
   Id. Paragraph 8; Am. Compl. Paragraph 17. Plaintiff states that the
   Governor then "unexpectedly reached over to [her], took her hand, and
   pulled her toward him, so that their bodies were close to each other."
   Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph 9. She states she removed her
   hand from his and retreated several feet, but that the Governor
   approached her again and, while saying, "I love the way your hair flows
   down your back" and "I love your curves," put his hand on her leg,
   started sliding it toward her pelvic area, and bent down to attempt to kiss
   her on the neck, all without her consent. Id. Paragraphs 9-10; Pl.'s
   Depo. at 237-38.5 Plaintiff states that she exclaimed, "What are you
   doing?," told the Governor that she was "not that kind of girl," and
   "escaped" from the Governor's reach "by walking away from him." Pl.'s
   Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph 11; Pl.'s Depo. at 237. She states
   she was extremely upset and confused and, not knowing what to do,
   attempted to distract the Governor by chatting about his wife. Pl.'s
   Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph 11. Plaintiff states that she sat down
   at the end of the sofa nearest the door, but that the Governor
   approached the sofa where she had taken a seat and, as he sat down,
   "lowered his trousers and underwear, exposed his penis (which was
   erect) and told [her] to 'kiss it.'" Id.6 She states that she was "horrified"
   by this and that she "jumped up from the couch" and told the Governor
   that she had to go, saying something to the effect that she had to get
   back to the registration desk. Id. Paragraph 12. Plaintiff states that the
   Governor, "while fondling his penis," said, "Well, I don't want to make
   you do anything you don't want to do," and then pulled up his pants and
   said, "If you get in trouble for leaving work, have Dave call me
   immediately and I'll take care of it." Id. She states that as she left the
   room (the door of which was not locked), the Governor "detained" her
   momentarily, "looked sternly" at her, and said, "You are smart. Let's
   keep this between ourselves." Id.; Pl.'s Depo. at 94, 96-97.7

   Plaintiff states that the Governor's advances to her were unwelcome,
   that she never said or did anything to suggest to the Governor that she
   was willing to have sex with him, and that during the time they were
   together in the hotel suite, she resisted his advances although she was
   "stunned by them and intimidated by who he was.' Pl.'s Statement of
   Mat. Facts, Paragraph 14. She states that when the Governor referred to
   Dave Harrington, she "understood that he was telling her that he had
   control over Mr. Harrington and over her job, and that he was willing to
   use that power." Id. Paragraph 13. She states that from this point on, she
   was "very fearful" that her refusal to submit to the Governor's advances
   could damage her career and even jeopardize her employment. Id.

   Plaintiff states that when she left the hotel suite, she was in shock and
   upset but tried to maintain her composure. Id. Paragraph 15. She states
   she saw Ferguson waiting outside the suite but that he did not escort her
   back to the registration desk and nothing was said between them. Id.
   Ferguson states that five or ten minutes after plaintiff exited the suite he
   joined the Governor for their return to the Governor's Mansion and that
   the Governor, who was working on some papers that he had spread out
   on the desk, said, "She came up here, and nothing happened." Id.
   Paragraph 16; Ferguson Depo. at 63.

   Plaintiff states she returned to the registration desk and told Blackard
   some of what had happened. Blackard Depo. at 68. Blackard states that
   plaintiff was shaking and embarrassed. Id. Following the Conference,
   plaintiff states she went to the workplace of a friend, Debra Ballentine,
   and told her of the incident as well. Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts,
   Paragraph 18. Ballentine states that plaintiff was upset and crying.
   Ballentine Depo. at 48. Later that same day, plaintiff states she told her
   sister, Charlotte Corbin Brown, what had happened and, within the next
   two days, also told her other sister, Lydia Corbin Cathey, of the incident.
   Id. Paragraph 20. Brown's observations of plaintiff's demeanor
   apparently are not included in the record. Cathey, however, states that
   plaintiff was "bawling" and "squalling," and that she appeared scared,
   embarrassed, and ashamed. Cathey Depo. at 52.

   Ballentine states that she encouraged plaintiff to report the incident to her
   boss or to the police, but that plaintiff declined, pointing out that her boss
   was friends with the Governor and that the police were the ones who
   took her to the hotel suite. Ballentine Depo. at 50. Ballentine further
   states that plaintiff stated she did not want her flanc,6 to know of the
   incident and that she "just want[ed] this thing to go away." Id. Plaintiff
   states that what the Governor and Ferguson had said and done made her
   "afraid" to file charges. Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph 19.

   Plaintiff continued to work at AIDC following the alleged incident in the
   hotel suite. Id. Paragraph 22. One of her duties was to deliver
   documents to and from the Office of the Governor, as well as other
   offices around the Arkansas State Capitol. Id. She states that in June
   1991, while performing the duties for the AIDC, she encountered
   Ferguson who told her that Mrs. Clinton was out of town often and that
   the Governor wanted her phone number and wanted to see her. Id.
   Plaintiff states she refused to provide her phone number to Ferguson. Id.
   She states that Ferguson also asked her how her fiancé, Steve, was
   doing, even though she had never told Ferguson or the Governor his
   name, and that this "frightened" her. Id. Paragraph 23. Plaintiff states
   that she again encountered Ferguson following her return to work from
   maternity leave and that he said he had "told Bill how good looking you
   are since you've had the baby." Id. Paragraph 25. She also states that
   she was "accosted" by the Governor in the Rotunda of the Arkansas
   State Capitol when he "draped his arm over her, pulled her close to him
   and held her tightly to his body," and said to his bodyguard, "Don't we
   make a beautiful couple: Beauty and the Beast?" Id. Paragraph 24.
   Plaintiff additionally states that on an unspecified date, she was waiting
   in the Governor's outer office on a delivery run when the Governor
   entered the office, patted her on the shoulder, and in a "friendly fashion"
   said, "How are you doing, Paula?" Pl.'s Depo. at 244-45.

   Plaintiff states that she continued to work at AIDC "even though she
   was in constant fear that [the Governor] would retaliate against her
   because she had refused to have sex with him." Id. Paragraph 27. She
   states this fear prevented her from enjoying her job. Id. Plaintiff states
   that she was treated "very rudely" by certain superiors in AIDC,
   including her direct supervisor, Clydine Pennington, and that this "rude
   treatment" had not happened prior to her encounter with the Governor.
   Id. She states that after her maternity leave, she was transferred to a
   position which had much less responsibility and that much of the time
   she had nothing to do. Id. Paragraph 28; Pl.'s Depo. at 53. Plaintiff
   states that she was not learning anything, that her work could not be
   fairly evaluated, and that as a result, she could not be fairly considered
   for advancement and other opportunities. Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts,
   Paragraph 28. She states that Pennington told her the reason for the
   transfer was that her prior position had been eliminated, but that she later
   learned this was untrue, as her former position was being occupied by
   another employee. Id. Plaintiff states that she repeatedly expressed to
   Pennington an interest in transferring to particular positions at a higher
   "grade" which involved more challenging duties, more potential for
   advancement, and more compensation, but that Pennington always
   discouraged her from doing so and told her she should not bother to
   apply for those positions. Id. Paragraph 29. She goes on to state that her
   superiors exhibited hostility toward her by moving her work location,
   refusing to give her meaningful work, watching her constantly, and
   failing to give her flowers on Secretary's Day in 1992, even though all
   the other women in the office received flowers. Id. Paragraph 30.

   Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment with AMC on February
   20, 1993, in order to move to California with her husband, who had
   been transferred. Am. Compl. Paragraph 40; Pl.'s Depo. at 48. She
   states that in January 1994, while visiting family and friends in Arkansas,
   she was informed of an article in The American Spectator magazine that
   she claims referred to her alleged encounter with the Governor at the
   Excelsior Hotel and incorrectly suggested that she had engaged in sexual
   relations with the Governor. Pl.'s Statement of Mat. Facts, Paragraph
   33. Plaintiff states that she also encountered Ferguson in a restaurant
   during this same time and that he indicated he was the source for the
   article and that he knew she had refused the Governor's alleged
   advances because, he said, "Clinton told me you wouldn't do anything
   anyway, Paula." Id. Paragraph 35.

   On February 11, 1994, at an event attended by the media, plaintiff states
   that she publicly asked President Clinton to acknowledge the incident
   mentioned in the article in The American Spectator, to state that she had
   rejected his advances, and to apologize to her, but that the President
   responded to her request for an apology by having his press
   spokespersons deliver a statement on his behalf that the incident never
   happened and that he never met plaintiff. Am. Compl. Paragraphs
   47-48. Thereafter, on May 6, 1994, plaintiff filed this lawsuit.

   Plaintiff's amended complaint contains several claims, three of which
   remain at issue. See Jones, 974 F. Supp. 712; Order of November 24,
   1997. The first is a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 in which
   plaintiff alleges that Governor Clinton, acting under color of state law,
   deprived her of her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws
   under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by
   sexually harassing her. The second is a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section
   1985(3) in which plaintiff alleges that Governor Clinton and Ferguson
   conspired to deprive her of her rights to equal Protection of the laws and
   of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. The third is a state
   law claim in which plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional infliction of
   emotional distress or outrage against Governor Clinton, based primarily
   on the alleged incident at the hotel but also encompassing subsequent
   alleged acts.

                          II.

   The President moves for summary judgment on the following grounds:
   (1) plaintiff cannot show either quid pro quo or hostile work
   environment sexual harassment under Section 1983 because (a) the
   record plainly demonstrates that plaintiff did not suffer any tangible job
   detriment for purposes of establishing a quid pro quo claim, let alone
   one caused by her purported rejection of Mr. Clinton's alleged sexual
   advances, and (b) the alleged actions as described by plaintiff, even
   resolving all inferences and factual disputes in her favor, do not
   constitute severe or pervasive abusive conduct for purposes of
   establishing a hostile work environment claim; (2) if plaintiff's Section
   1983 claim fails, so too does her Section 1995 conspiracy claim because
   (a) plaintiff has failed to show that any such conspiracy actually resulted
   in a deprivation of her constitutional rights, and (b) the undisputed facts
   do not show any agreement between Governor Clinton and Trooper
   Ferguson to deprive plaintiff of her constitutional rights; and (3)
   plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage
   fails because (a) by plaintiff's own testimony, the conduct at issue does
   not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress or outrage under
   Arkansas law, and (b) plaintiff did not as a result of the alleged conduct
   suffer emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could
   endure it. Ferguson, in turn, moves for summary judgment on grounds
   that (1) even if everything plaintiff has alleged were true, she does not
   have evidence to show either quid pro quo or hostile work environment
   sexual harassment, and (2) there was no conspiracy between the
   President and Ferguson to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights by
   sexually harassing her. The President and Ferguson both argue that there
   are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to any of these issues
   and that they are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

                          A.

   Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions,
   answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
   affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
   fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
   law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As a prerequisite to summary judgment, a
   moving party must demonstrate "an absence of evidence to support the
   non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
   (1986). Once the moving party has properly supported its motion for
   summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply
   show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
   Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
   The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials of his
   pleading, but must "come forward with 'specific facts showing that there
   is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 587 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) and
   adding emphasis). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
   242, 256 (1986). The inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
   must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
   motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587 (citations
   omitted). However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead
   a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no
   'genuine issue for trial.'" Id. (citation omitted).

                          B.

   As a preliminary matter, the Court rejects plaintiff's contention that this
   case involves equal Protection claims based not only on sexual
   harassment, but also on sexual assault and offensive conduct in violation
   of laws other than Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e et seq. Pl.'s
   Opp'n to DeL Clinton's Mot. for Summ. l. at 23. in its August 22
   Memorandum Opinion and Order, this Court recognized that a sexual
   assault can be a constitutional violation under Section 1983, but
   concluded that plaintiff's allegations, even if true, were insufficient to
   state such a claim. See Jones, 974 F.Supp. at 724-25 (citing Haberthur
   v. City of Raymore, Mo., 1 19 F. 3d 720 (8th Cir. 1997); Reeve v.
   Oliver, 41 P. 3d 381 (8h Cir. 1994) (per curiam)). Notwithstanding the
   unequivocal ruling of this Court, plaintiff, citing Fed.R.Evid. 413(d)(2),
   (3), and (5),8 now contends that she has an actionable claim of criminal
   sexual assault based on the Governor's alleged actions in the Excelsior
   Hotel and cites as authority for this proposition an Arkansas criminal
   statute proscribing sexual abuse in the first degree, Ark. Code Ann.
   Section 5-14-108.9 PI. " s Opp'n to Def. Clinton's Mot. for Summ. J. at
   23-24.

   The Court finds plaintiff s attempt to restate her sexual assault claim in
   the guise of an equal protection claim to be no more meritorious now
   than when it was raised in the context of a due process claim. Although
   the Governor's alleged conduct, if true, may certainly be characterized as
   boorish and offensive, even a most charitable reading of the record in
   this case fails to reveal a basis for a claim of criminal sexual assault as
   there is no alleged conduct that could be characterized as "forcible
   compulsion' or 'sexual contact' for purposes of establishing a claim under
   the provision cited by plaintiff. See Ark. Code Ann. Section 5-14-101
   (2), (8) (defining "forcible compulsion" as "physical force or a threat,
   express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any
   person," and defining "sexual contact" as many act of sexual gratification
   involving the touching, directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, or
   buttocks, or anus of a person or the breast of a females).10 There being
   no actionable claim of criminal sexual assault under the facts of this case,
   the Court will proceed to a determination of the issues relevant to
   plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment.

                          1.

   The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment confers a
   right to be free from gender discrimination that is not substantially related
   to important governmental objectives. Beardsley v. Webb, 30 F.3d 524,
   529 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35
   (1979)). Applying this precept, courts have found that intentional sexual
   harassment of employees by persons acting under color of state law
   violates the Fourteenth Amendment and is actionable under Section
   1983. Id. (citing Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F. 2d 104, 113-14 (1st Cir.
   1991); Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F. 2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir.
   1986)). See also Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F. 3d
   539, 550 (5th Cir. 1997); Whitney v. State of New Mexico, 113 F.3d
   1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1997); Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 43
   (2nd Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1335 (1997). A plaintiff wishing
   to sustain an equal protection claim of sexual harassment under the
   Fourteenth Amendment must show both "sexual harassment" and an
   "intent" to harass based upon that plaintiff's membership in a particular
   class of citizens - i.e., male or female. Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d
   1140, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1990). An individual plaintiff may pursue a
   sexual harassment claim under the Fourteenth Amendment based solely
   upon acts of harassment directed towards her, but such a claim must
   show an intent to harass because of her status as a female and not
   because of characteristics of her gender which are personal to her. Id. at
   1151. See also Bohen, 799 F.2d at 1187; Stafford v. State of Missouri,
   835 F.Supp. 1136, 1141 (W.D.Mo. 1993).

   Although the President contends that plaintiff cannot establish that he
   acted under color of state law with the intent to discriminate against her
   on the basis of her gender, he states that he reserves those issues for
   trial, if necessary, and seeks summary judgment solely on the grounds of
   plaintiff's failure to prove that she was subjected to conduct that
   corresponds to sexual harassment under Title VII. Before discussing that
   issue, however, the Court must address plaintiff's argument that the
   essential elements of a sexual harassment claim under Section 1983 do
   not correspond to those under Title VII (although she acknowledges
   there is some overlap) and that her burden of proof is something less
   than that required under Title VII. The Court rejects this argument.

   Throughout the pendency of this lawsuit, this Court and the parties have
   been operating under the assumption, based on the clear weight of
   authority, that a Section 1983 sexual harassment claim should be
   analyzed under the standards developed in similar Title VII litigation.
   See, e.g., Trautvetter, 916 P.2d at 1149 (noting that a claim of sexual
   harassment under Section 1983 must generally satisfy the contours of a
   sexual harassment claim under Title VII); Southard, 114 F.3d 539
   (applying Title VII standards to a Section 1983 claim); Cross v. State of
   Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that when
   Section 1983 is used as a parallel remedy for violations of Title VII, the
   elements of the two causes of action are the same); Beardley, 30 F.3d at
   529 (nothing that courts may apply the standards developed in Title VII
   litigation to similar litigation under Section 1983); Boutros v. Canton
   Reg'l Transit Auth., 997 F.2d 198, 202 (6th Cir. 1993) (nothing that
   Section 1983 and Title VII are largely parallel remedies in employment
   discrimination suits and applying the same elements of prima facie proof
   for racially hostile work environment to both Title VII and Section 1983
   claim). Indeed, in her memorandum in opposition to the President's
   motion for judgment on the pleadings (filed July 29, 1997), plaintiff
   stated that "[a] sexual harassment claim brought pursuant to Section
   1983 is similar to a Title VII sexual harassment claim" and cited King v.
   Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir.
   1990), for the proposition that a Section 1983 sexual harassment claim
   generally follows the contours of a Title VII claim. See Pl. Opp'n to Mot.
   for J. on the Pleadings at 8. In this regard, plaintiff recognized that courts
   have separated sexual harassment claims into two categories -- quid pro
   quo cases and hostile work environment cases -- and represented to this
   Court that her allegations, as analyzed under Title VII, were sufficient to
   state claims under both categories. Specifically, plaintiff stated with
   respect to her quid pro quo claim that sexual harassment occurs when,
   among other things, "rejection of such conduct by an individual is used
   as the basis for employment decisions," citing as support for this claim
   Title VII cases and guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment
   Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), see Pl. Opp'n to Mot. for J. on the
   Pleadings at 26, and stated with respect to her hostile environment claim,
   again citing Title VII cases and EEOC guidelines, that "[u]nder section
   1983, as under Title VII, it is unlawful to create a sexually hostile or
   abusive work environment," see id. at 18. Several of this Court's
   discovery rulings in favor of plaintiff were premised on this Court's
   understanding and plaintiff's representation (in her complaint and
   elsewhere) that she was asserting workplace harassment as understood in
   reference to Title VII standards, i.e., that she suffered tangible job
   detriments for her refusal to submit to Governor Clinton's alleged
   advances. Based on plaintiffs prior representations and the clear weight
   of authority, the Court will look to Title VII in addressing plaintiffs quid
   pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims.11

                          a.

   To make a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, this
   plaintiff must show, among other things, that her refusal to submit to
   unwelcome sexual advances or requests for sexual favors resulted in a
   tangible job detriment. Cram v. Lawson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466,
   473 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Kaufman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d
   178, 186 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992)). See also
   Sandepi v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F. 3d 331, 339 (5th Cir.
   1998) (noting that to withstand summary judgment on quid pro quo
   claims, plaintiffs were required to produce evidence showing that the
   harassment complained of affected tangible aspects of their
   compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment). "[A]
   supervisor's mere threat or promise of job-related harm or benefits in
   exchange for sexual favors does not constitute quid pro quo
   harassment..." Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C.Cir. 1995).

                          i.

   Apparently recognizing the infirm ground upon which her assertion of
   tangible job detriments rest (which will be discussed infra), plaintiff first
   argues that a showing of a tangible job detriment is not an essential
   element of an action for quid pro quo sexual harassment under Tide
   VII.12 The Court rejects this argument as it conflicts with the Eighth
   Circuit's requirement that a refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual
   advances or requests for sexual favors resulted in a tangible job
   detriment, see Cram, 49 F. 3d at 473, and conflicts with the majority of
   the other circuits on this point as well, including the recent decisions
   cited previously from the Fifth Circuit in Sanders, 134 F.3d 331, and the
   District of Columbia Circuit in Gary, 59 F. 3d 1391. See also
   Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F. 2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990)
   (concluding that it is the essence of quid pro quo harassment when an
   employee is subjected to unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor
   and her reaction to these advances affects tangible aspects of her
   compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment); Spencer
   v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 659 (4th Cir. 1990) (quid pro quo
   claim requires that the employee's reaction to the harassment affected
   tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment); Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth.,
   890 F. 2d 569, 579 (2nd Cir. 1989) (noting that the gravamen of a quid
   pro quo claim is that a tangible job benefit or privilege is conditioned on
   an employee's submission to sexual blackmail and that adverse
   consequences follow from the employee's refusal); Hicks v. Gates
   Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (104 Cir. 1987) (quid pro quo sexual
   harassment exists when adverse job consequences result from
   employee's refusal to submit to sexual advances); Sparks v. Pilot
   Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (11th Cir. 1987) (quid pro
   quo claim requires that the employee's reaction to the harassment
   affected tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms,
   conditions, or privileges of employment); Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l
   Management Co., 805 F. 2d 644, 649 (6 d, Cir. 1986) (no cause of
   action for quid pro quo sexual harassment where "the record [is] totally
   devoid of any evidence tending to demonstrate that plaintiff was denied a
   job benefit or suffered a job detriment as a result of her failure to engage
   in the activity suggested by [defendant]").

   Even without benefit of the settled authority requiring a showing of a
   tangible job detriment in quid pro quo cases, the three cases upon which
   plaintiff relies in support of her argument, Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503
   (9th Cir. 1994), Kayibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F. 3d 773 (2nd Cir.
   1994), and Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of America, 123 F. 3d 490 (7th
   Cir. 1997) (en banc) (plurality), cert. granted sub nom. Burlington
   Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 876 (Jan. 23, 1998), do not obviate
   the need for a showing of a tangible job detriment under the facts of this
   case. First, Nichols and Karibian were "submission" cases in which the
   victims of sexual harassment submitted, to the unwelcome sexual
   advances. Plaintiff, by contrast, alleges that she resisted Governor
   Clinton's alleged advances and thereby suffered reprisals in her
   workplace. The court in Karibian recognized the distinction between
   so-called "submission" and "refusal" cases, noting that "[i]n the nature of
   things, evidence of economic harm will not be available to support the
   claim of the employee who submits to the supervisor's demands." 14
   F.3d at 778. Both Nichols and Karibian were addressing the narrow
   situations before them in which the victim submitted to the demands for
   sexual favors and do not stand for the proposition that a showing of a
   tangible job detriment is unnecessary in a quid pro quo sexual
   harassment case where, as here, it is claimed that the alleged advances
   were resisted.

   While it is true that the Seventh Circuit in Jansen concluded that a "clear
   and unambiguous" quid pro quo threat that "clearly conditions concrete
   job benefits or detriments on compliance with sexual demands" can
   constitute an actionable claim "even if the threat remains unfulfilled,"
   123 F.3d at 499, plaintiff acknowledges that no one, including Governor
   Clinton, ever told her that if she refused to submit to his alleged
   advances it would have a negative effect on her job, that she had to
   submit to his alleged advances in order to receive job benefits, or that the
   Governor would use his relationship with AIDC Director Dave
   Harrington to penalize her in her job. Pl.'s Depo. at 74-75. She merely
   states that "read[ing] between the lines," she "knew what [the Governor]
   meant" when he allegedly indicated in the hotel suite that Harrington was
   his good friend. Id. at 75-76. Be that as it may, the Governor's alleged
   statements do not in any way constitute a clear threat that clearly
   conditions concrete job benefits or detriments on compliance with sexual
   demands.13 Plaintiffs claim therefore would not survive a Jansen
   analysis, her "read[ing] between the lines" notwithstanding. 123 F.3d at
   499.14

   Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a showing of a tangible job
   detriment is an essential element of plaintiff's quid pro quo sexual
   harassment claim. It is that issue to which the Court now turns.

                          ii.

   As evidence of tangible job detriments (or adverse employment
   action),15 plaintiff claims the following occurred after she resisted
   Governor Clinton's alleged advances on May 8, 1991: (1) she was
   discouraged from applying for more attractive jobs and seeking
   reclassification at a higher pay grade within the AIDC; (2) her job was
   changed to one with fewer responsibilities, less attractive duties and less
   potential for advancement -- and the reason given for the change proved
   to be untrue; (3) she was effectively denied access to grievance
   procedures that would otherwise have been available to victims of sexual
   harassment; and (4) she was mistreated in ways having tangible
   manifestations, such as isolating her physically, making her sit in a
   location from which she was constantly watched, making her sit at her
   workstation with no work to do, and singling her out as the only female
   employee not to be given flowers on Secretary's Day. The Court has
   carefully reviewed the record in this case and finds nothing in plaintiff s
   employment records, her own testimony, or the testimony of her
   supervisors showing that plaintiff's reaction to Governor Clinton's alleged
   advances affected tangible aspects of her compensation, terms,
   conditions, or privileges of employment.

                          1.

   Plaintiff's claim that she was discouraged from applying for more
   attractive jobs and seeking reclassification at a higher pay grade within
   the AIDC does not demonstrate any "tangible" job detriment as she has
   not identified a single specific job which she desired or applied for at
   AIDC but which she had been discouraged from seeking. Pl.'s Depo. at
   37-40. When asked for such specific information, plaintiff merely
   testified that the unidentified jobs she sought were "a grade higher" but
   that her supervisor "would always discourage me and make me believe
   that I could grow within the administrative services, which in fact I
   didn't. I got degrade - downgraded." Id. at 38, 42. She further states that
   those "few" times that she would talk to her supervisor and receive
   discouragement, she "would go ahead and fill out an application maybe
   or something." Id. at 41. There is no record of plaintiff ever applying for
   another job within AIDC, however, and the record shows that not only
   was plaintiff never downgraded, her position was reclassified upward
   from a Grade 9 classification to a Grade 11 classification, thereby
   increasing her annual wary. Pennington Aff. Paragraph 6; Arkansas
   Human Resources Management System Payroll Data Form for P.R.
   Jones, Ex. B-7. Indeed, it is undisputed that plaintiff received every
   merit increase and cost-of-living allowance for which she was eligible
   during her nearly two-year tenure with the AIDC and consistently
   received satisfactory job evaluations. See id. Specifically, on July 1,
   1991, less than two months after the alleged incident that is the subject
   of this lawsuit, plaintiff received a cost-of-living increase and her position
   was reclassified from Grade 9 to Grade 11; on August 28, 1991, plaintiff
   received a satisfactory job evaluation from her supervisor, Clydine
   Pennington; on March 11, 1992, the one-year anniversary of her hire
   date with AIDC, plaintiff received another satisfactory evaluation from
   Pennington and Cherry Duckett, Deputy Director of AIDC, which
   entitled her to a merit raise. Id. In addition, plaintiff was given a
   satisfactory job review in an evaluation covering the period of March
   1992 until her voluntary departure from the AIDC in February 1993. Ex.
   B-6. Plaintiff signed this review on February 16, 1993, see id., and
   would have received another merit increase one month later in
   accordance with this review had she elected to continue her employment
   at AIDC. Pennington Aff. Paragraph 8.

   It is plaintiff's burden to come forward with "specific facts' showing that
   there is a genuine issue for trial, see Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, and
   the Court finds that her testimony on this point, being of a most general
   and non-specific nature (and in some cases contradictory to the record),
   simply does not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact regarding any
   tangible job detriment as a result of her having allegedly been
   discouraged from seeking more attractive jobs and reclassification. Cf.
   Splunge v. Shoneys, Inc., 874 F.Supp. 1258, 1271 (M.D.Ala. 1994)
   (where plaintiff claimed that she never Specifically requested a
   promotion or raise because it would have been futile as she had not
   surrendered to supervisor's harassment, court held this was insufficient
   to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding denial of economic
   benefits as it Was "a mere inference based on speculation and
   conjecture").

                          2.

   Equally without merit is plaintiff's assertion that following her return
   from maternity leave in September 1992, she suffered a tangible job
   detriment when her job was changed to one with fewer responsibilities,
   less attractive duties and less potential for advancement.16 These matters
   do not constitute a tangible job detriment as it is undisputed that there
   was no diminution in plaintiff's salary or change in her job classification
   following her return from maternity leave and, further, that her last
   review at AIDC following her return was positive and would have
   entitled her to another merit increase had she not resigned her position in
   order to move to California with her husband. Changes in duties or
   working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage,
   such as diminution in title, salary, or benefits, are insufficient to establish
   the adverse conduct required to make a case. Harlston v. McDonnell
   Douglas Corp., 37 F. 3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).

   Although plaintiff states that her job title upon returning from maternity
   leave was no longer that of purchasing assistant and that this change in
   title impaired her potential for promotion, her job duties prior to taking
   maternity leave and her job duties upon returning to work both involved
   data input; the difference being that instead of responsibility for data
   entry of AIDC purchase orders and driving records, she was assigned
   data entry responsibilities for employment applications. Pl.'s Depo. at 56;
   Pennington Aff. Paragraph 16. That being so, plaintiff cannot establish a
   tangible job detriment. A transfer that does not involve a demotion in
   form or substance and involves only minor changes in working
   conditions, with no reduction in pay or benefits, will not constitute an
   adverse employment action, "[o]therwise every trivial personnel action
   that an irritable ... employee did not like would form the basis of a
   discrimination suit." Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th
   Cir. 1997) (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F. 3d
   270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996)). See also Montandon v. Farmland Indus. Inc.,
   116 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1997) (requirement that an employee move
   to another town with the same employer did not rise to the level of an
   adverse employment action, irrespective of how unpalatable it may have
   been to the employee, where there was no change in position, title,
   salary, or any other aspect of his employment). Whether or not the
   reasons given for the change were untrue, plaintiff's allegations describe
   nothing "more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of
   job responsibilities." See Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382 (quoting Crady v.
   Liberty Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993)).17

                          3.

   The Court also rejects plaintiff's claim that she was effectively denied
   access to grievance procedures that would otherwise have been available
   to victims of sexual harassment. Plaintiff merely states that from her
   "perspective," it "appeared very unlikely that any good would come from
   pursuing a grievance," and that "it was natural for her to conclude that
   invoking the grievance procedure would be futile and perhaps worse."
   Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Clinton's Mot. for Summ. J. at 40-41, 47. As the
   Court has previously noted, however, plaintiff acknowledges that she
   was never threatened with adverse employment action if she did not
   submit to the Governor's alleged advances, but that she was only
   "read[ing] between the lines." Pl.'s Depo. at 75-76. Such subjective
   perceptions and beliefs regarding the efficacy of invoking any grievance
   procedures are nothing more than "speculation and conjecture" and do
   not constitute a tangible job detriment. Splunge, 874 F.Supp. at 1271.
   See also Cram, 49 F. 3d at 474 (plaintiff's subjective belief that
   defendant had threatened job retaliation did not state a claim of quid pro
   quo sexual harassment).

                          4.

   Finally, the Court rejects plaintiff's claim that she was subjected to
   hostile treatment having tangible effects when she was isolated
   physically, made to sit in a location from which she was constantly
   watched, made to sit at her workstation with no work to do, and singled
   out as the only female employee not to be given flowers on Secretary's
   Day. Plaintiff may well have perceived hostility and animus on the part
   of her supervisors,18 but these perceptions are merely conclusory in
   nature and do not, without more, constitute a tangible job detriment.
   Absent evidence of some more tangible change in duties or working
   conditions that constitute a material employment disadvantage, of which
   the court has already determined does not exist, general allegations of
   hostility and personal animus are not sufficient to demonstrate any
   adverse employment action that constitutes the sort of ultimate decision
   intended to be actionable under Title VII. Manning v. Metropolitan Life
   Ins. Co., 127 F. 3d 686, 692-93 (8'h Cir. 1997) (citing Ledergerber, 122
   F.3d at 1144; Montandon, 116 F.3d at 359).

   Similarly, plaintiffs allegations regarding her work station being moved so
   that she had to sit directly outside Pennington's office and, at times, not
   having work to do,19 describe nothing more than minor or de minimis
   personnel matters which, again without more, are insufficient to
   constitute a tangible job detriment or adverse employment action. Cf
   Hicks v. Brown, 929 F.Supp. 1184, 1190 (E.D.Ark. 1996) (case in
   which this Court found no adverse employment action, notwithstanding
   allegations of a pattern of negative or adverse actions taken against the
   plaintiff - including a critical E-Mail from plaintiff's supervisor, verbal
   counseling of plaintiff by her supervisor, and a low rating on plaintiffs
   proficiency report - where no financial harm, termination, or suspension
   had occurred).

   Although it is not clear why plaintiff failed to receive flowers on
   Secretary's Day in 1992, such an omission does not give rise to a federal
   cause of action in the absence of evidence of some more tangible change
   in duties or working conditions that constitute a material employment
   disadvantage. See Manning, 127 F.3d at 692-93.
                          iii.

   In sum, the Court finds that a showing of a tangible job detriment or
   adverse employment action is an essential element of plaintiffs Section
   1983 quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and that plaintiff has not
   demonstrated any tangible job detriment or adverse employment action
   for her refusal to submit to the Governor's alleged advances. The
   President is therefore. entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claim
   of quid pro quo sexual harassment.

                          b.

   The Court now turns to plaintiff's hostile work environment claim.
   Unlike quid pro quo sexual harassment, hostile work environment
   harassment arises when "sexual conduct has the purpose or effect of
   unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
   creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment."
   Cram, 49 F. 3d at 474 (quoting Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010,
   1013 (8th Cir. 1988)). To prevail on a hostile work environment cause
   of action, a plaintiff must establish, among other things, that she was
   subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment based upon her sex that
   affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Callanan v.
   Runyun, 75 F.3d 1293, 1296 (e Cir. 1996). See also Todd v. Ortho
   Biotech, Inc., - F.3d -, 1998 WL 92207, *2 (8th Cir. March 5, 1998);
   Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997); Quick v.
   Donaldson Co. , 90 F. 3d 1372, 1377 (8th Cir. 1996). The behavior
   creating the hostile working environment need not be overtly sexual in
   nature, but it must be 'unwelcome' in the sense that the employee did not
   solicit or invite it, and the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable
   or offensive." Cram, 49 F.3d at 474 (quoting Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014).
   The harassment must also be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter
   the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
   environment." Id. (quoting Meyltor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
   67 (1986)). See also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
   (1993).

   The President essentially argues that aside from the alleged incident at
   the Excelsior Hotel, plaintiff alleges only two other contacts with him,
   alleges only a few additional contacts with Ferguson, and contains
   conclusory claims that plaintiff s supervisors were rude. He argues that
   taken individually or as a whole, these contacts do not in any way
   constitute the kind of pervasive, intimidating, abusive conduct that courts
   require to establish a hostile work environment claim. The Court agrees.

   In assessing the hostility of an environment, a court must look to the
   totality of the circumstances. Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages,
   27 F. 3d 1316, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994). Circumstances to be considered
   include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
   whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
   utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
   work performance." Harris, 510 U-S, at 23. No single factor is
   determinative, see id., and the court "should not carve the work
   environment into a series of discrete incidents and then measure the
   harm occurring in each episode." Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc.,
   955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992).

   First, the Court finds plaintiff's reliance on her assertions of tangible job
   detriment as establishing a hostile work environment, see Pl.'s Opp'n to
   Def. Clinton's Mot. for Summ. J. at 5 1, to be misplaced. In its August
   22 Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court noted that although the
   President's argument for outright dismissal of plaintiff's hostile work
   environment claim had "some force," further development of the record
   was nevertheless necessary. Jones, 974 F. Supp. at 724. The Court
   based this conclusion in large part on plaintiff's representations that her
   rejection of the President's alleged advances caused her to suffer adverse
   employment actions, including being transferred to a position that had no
   responsible duties for which she could be adequately evaluated to earn
   advancement and failing to receive raises and merit increases. Id. In this
   regard, the Court determined that the "totality" of the allegations alleged
   in this case were such that they could be said to have altered the
   conditions of plaintiff's employment and created an abusive work
   environment. Id. However, development of the record has now
   established that plaintiffs allegations of adverse employment actions are
   without merit, see Section II(b)(2)(a)(ii), supra, with her claim of failing
   to receive cost of living increases apparently having even been
   abandoned. See id. at n. 16. Plaintiff received every merit increase and
   cost-of-Living allowance for which she was eligible during her nearly
   two-year tenure with the AIDC, her job was upgraded from Grade 9 to
   Grade 11 (thereby increasing her salary), she consistently received
   satisfactory job evaluations, and her job responsibilities upon her return
   from maternity leave were not significantly different from prior to her
   taking leave and did not cause her any materially significant
   disadvantage. These facts are clearly established by the record and dispel
   the notion that she was subjected to a hostile work environment.

   Plaintiff certainly has not shown under the totality of the circumstances
   that the alleged incident in the hotel and her additional encounters with
   Ferguson and the Governor were so severe or pervasive that it created
   an abusive working environment. Callanan, 75 F. 3d at 1296. She
   admits that she never missed a day of work following the alleged incident
   in the hotel, she continued to work at AIDC another nineteen months
   (leaving only because of her husband's job transfer), she continued to go
   on a daily basis to the Governor's Office to deliver items and never
   asked to be relieved of that duty, she never filed a formal complaint or
   told her supervisors of the incident while at AIDC, and she never
   consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist, or incurred medical bills as a result
   of the alleged incident. Pl.'s. Depo. at 44- 45, 48, 62, 121-23. In
   addition, plaintiff has not shown how Ferguson's alleged comments,
   whether considered alone or in conjunction with the other alleged
   conduct in this case, interfered with her work, and she acknowledges
   that the Governor's statement about him and her looking like "beauty
   and the beast" was made "in a light vein" and that his patting her on the
   shoulder and asking her how she was doing was done in a "friendly
   fashion." Pl.'s Depo. at 243, 245.

   While the alleged incident in the hotel, if true, was certainly boorish and
   offensive, the Court has already found that the Governor's alleged
   conduct does not constitute sexual assault. See Section II(B), infra. This
   is thus not one of those exceptional cases in which a single incident of
   sexual harassment, such as an assault, was deemed sufficient to state a
   claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment. Cf. Crisonino v.
   New York City Housing Auth., 985 F.Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
   (supervisor called plaintiff a "dumb bitch" and "shoved her so hard that
   she fell backward and hit the floor, sustaining injuries from which she
   has yet to fully recover").

   Considering the totality of the circumstances, it simply cannot be said
   that the conduct to which plaintiff was allegedly subjected was frequent,
   severe, or physically threatening, and the Court finds that defendants'
   actions as shown by the record do not constitute the kind of sustained
   and nontrivial conduct necessary for a claim of hostile work
   environment. Cf. Lam v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 122 F. 3d 654,
   656-57 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that single exposure to offensive
   videotape was not severe or pervasive enough to create hostile
   environment); Montandon, 116 F.3d at 358 (exposure to offensive
   behavior by supervisor on one instance does not satisfy "severe or
   pervasive" requirement under Title VII); Sprague v. Thorn Americas,
   Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (7th Cir. 1997) (five sexually-oriented
   incidents spread out over the course of 16 months not sufficiently severe
   or pervasive enough to create hostile work environment); Saxton v.
   American Tel & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) ("relatively
   limited" instances of unwanted sexual advances, which included the
   supervisor placing his hand on plaintiff's leg above the knee several
   times, rubbing his hand along her upper thigh, kissing her several
   seconds, and "lurch[ing] at her from behind some bushes," did not create
   an objectively hostile work environment).

   In sum, the Court finds that the record does not demonstrate conduct
   that was so severe or pervasive that it can be said to have altered the
   conditions of plaintiff's employment and created an abusive working
   environment. Accordingly, the President is entitled to summary judgment
   on plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.

                          2.

   The Court now turns to plaintiff's Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim. In
   order to prove the existence of a civil rights conspiracy under Section
   1985 (3), a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that another person
   was injured in his person or property or deprived of having and
   exercising any right or privilege of a citizen in the United States. Larson
   v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc). "Section
   1985(3) provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy
   for violation of the rights it designates." Great American Fed. Savings &
   Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979).

   Plaintiff does not have a viable Section 1985(3) claim in this case as the
   Court has determined that her Section 1983 quid pro quo and hostile
   work environment sexual harassment claims are without merit and
   warrant a grant of summary judgment. Absent an underlying violation of
   federal law, there can be no actionable claim alleging a conspiracy to
   achieve that end. See Larson, 76 F. 3d at 1456 (noting that where there
   was no evidence from which a jury could conclude that any injury to or
   deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights actually occurred, there
   was no Section 1985(3) conspiracy claim); Wiggins v. Hitchens, 853
   F.Supp. 505, 511 (D.D.C. 1994) (noting that "[t]here can be no
   recovery under section 1985(3) absent a violation of a substantive
   federal right"); Escamilla v. City of Santa Ana, 606 F. Supp. 928, 934
   (C.D.Ca. 1985) (noting that "[t]here can be no action for conspiracy
   under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985 or for failure to prevent a conspiracy
   under 42 U.S.C. Section 1986 when no civil rights violation has
   occurred"), aff'd, 796 F.2d 266 (9" Cir. 1986); Garrison v. Burke, 1997
   WL 37909, *10 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 27, 1997) (where there was no underlying
   deprivation of equal protection, plaintiff was precluded from establishing
   Section 1985(3) claim as there was no showing of injury to person or
   property).

                          3.

   Finally, the Court addresses plaintiff s state law claim of intentional
   infliction of emotional distress or outrage.20 Arkansas recognizes a claim
   of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on sexual harassment.
   Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distribs., Inc., 981 F.2d 340, 342 (8th Cir.
   1992) (citing Hale v. Ladd, 826 S.W.2d 244 (Ark. 1992)). To establish a
   claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove
   that: (1) the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or
   should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his
   conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous and utterly
   intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the defendant's conduct was the
   cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) the plaintiff's emotional distress
   was so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be expected to
   endure it. Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 937 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Ark. 1997);
   Hollomon v. Keadle, 931 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Ark. 1996); Cherepski v.
   Walker, 913 S.W.2d 761, 767 (Ark. 1996); Croom v. Younts, 913
   S.W.2d 283, 286 (Ark. 1996).

   The President argues that the alleged conduct of which plaintiff
   complains was brief and isolated; did not result in any physical harm or
   objective symptoms of the requisite severe distress; did not result in
   distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure
   it; and he had no knowledge of any special condition of plaintiff that
   would render her particularly susceptible to distress. He argues that
   plaintiff has failed to identify the kind of clear cut proof that Arkansas
   courts require for a claim of outrage and that he is therefore entitled to
   summary judgment. The Court agrees.21

   One is subject to liability for the tort of outrage or intentional infliction of
   emotional distress if he or she willfully or wantonly causes severe
   emotional distress to another by extreme and outrageous conduct.
   Sterling Drug Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Ark. 1988). See
   also Ingram v. Pirelli Cable Corp., 747 S.W.2d 103, 105 (Ark. 1988).
   In M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 596 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Ark. 1980), the
   Arkansas Supreme Court stated that "[b]y extreme and outrageous
   conduct, we mean conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
   extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and
   to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civil society."
   Whether conduct is "extreme and outrageous" is determined by looking
   at "the conduct at issue; the period of time over which the conduct took
   place; the relation between plaintiff and defendant; and defendant's
   knowledge that plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress
   by reason of some physical or mental peculiarity." Doe v. Wright, 82
   P.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Hamaker, 51 F. 3d at 111). The
   tort is clearly not intended to provide legal redress for every slight insult
   or indignity that one must endure. Manning, 127 F.3d at 690 (citing
   Hamaker, 51 F. 3d at 110). The Arkansas courts take a strict approach
   and give a narrow view to claims of outrage, see id., and merely
   describing conduct as outrageous does not make it so. Ross, 817 S.W.2d
   at 420.

   Plaintiff seems to base her claim of outrage on her erroneous belief that
   the allegations she has presented are sufficient to constitute criminal
   sexual assault. She states that "Mr. Clinton's outrageous conduct includes
   offensive language, an offensive proposition, offensive touching
   (constituting sexual assault under both federal, and state definitions), and
   actual exposure of an intimate private body part," and that " [t]here are
   few more outrageous acts than a criminal sexual assault followed by
   unwanted exposure, coupled with a demand for oral sex by the most
   powerful man in the state against a very young, low-level employee."
   Pl.'s Opp'n to Def. Clinton's Mot. for Summ. J. at 66 (emphasis in
   original).

   While the Court will certainly agree that plaintiffs allegations describe
   offensive conduct, the Court, as previously noted, has found that the
   Governor's alleged conduct does not constitute sexual assault. Rather,
   the conduct as alleged by plaintiff d a mere sexual proposition or
   encounter, albeit an odious one, that was relatively brief in duration, did
   not involve any coercion or threats of reprisal, and was abandoned as
   soon as plaintiff made clear that the advance was not welcome. The
   Court is not aware of any authority holding that such a sexual encounter
   or proposition of the type alleged in this case, without more, gives rise to
   a claim of outrage. Cf. Croom, 913 S.W.2d 287 (use of wine and
   medication by a vastly older relative to foist sex on a minor cousin went
   "beyond a mere sexual encounter" and offended all sense of decency).

   Moreover, notwithstanding the offensive nature of the Governor's
   alleged conduct, plaintiff admits that she never missed a day of work
   following the alleged incident, she continued to work at AIDC another
   nineteen months (leaving only because of her husband's job transfer),
   she continued to go on a daily basis to the Governor's Office to deliver
   items and never asked to be relieved of that duty, she never filed a
   formal complaint or told her supervisors of the incident while at AIDC,
   she never consulted a psychiatrist, psychologist, or incurred medical bills
   as a result of the alleged incident, and she acknowledges that her two
   subsequent contacts with the Governor involved comments made "in a
   light vein" and nonsexual contact that was done in a "friendly fashion."
   Further, despite earlier claiming that she suffered marital discord and
   humiliation, plaintiff stated in her deposition that she was not claiming
   damages to her marriage as a result of the Governor's alleged conduct,
   see Pl.'s Depo. at 122, and she acknowledged the request to drop her
   claim of injury to reputation by stating, "I didn't really care if it was
   dropped or not personally." Id. at 261-62. Plaintiff's actions and
   statements in this case do not portray someone who experienced
   emotional distress so severe in nature that no reasonable person could be
   expected to endure it. Cf. Hamaker, 51 F.3d 108 (no claim of outrage
   where plaintiff, who had a speech impediment and an I.Q. of between
   75 and 100, was "red-faced and angry," had an "increased heart rate and
   blood pressure," and had trouble sleeping four days after incident
   involving "rather nasty" practical joke).

   Nevertheless, plaintiff submits a declaration from a purported expert with
   a Ph.D in education and counseling, Patrick J. Carnes, who, after a 3.5
   hour meeting with plaintiff and her husband a mere four days prior to the
   filing of President Clinton's motion for summary judgment, opines that
   her alleged encounter with Governor Clinton in 1991, "and the ensuing
   events," have caused plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress and
   "consequent sexual aversion." The Court does not credit this declaration.

   In Angle v. Alexander, 945 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1997), the Arkansas
   Supreme Court noted that absent physical hart, courts look for more in
   the way of extreme outrage as an assurance that the mental disturbance
   claimed is not fictitious. Id. at 936-37. In that case, the plaintiffs offered
   their own testimony that they had experienced emotional distress,
   thoughts of death, fear, anger, and worry, but little else. Id.In concluding
   that there was no evidence of extreme emotional distress required to
   prevail on an outrage claim, the Court found it significant that none had
   seen a physician or mental health professional for these concerns. Id.
   The Court did not allow the fact that one plaintiff "on the advice of her
   attorney, spoke to a psychologist," to overcome her failure of proof on
   this point. Id at 937 n.3.

   Aside from other deficiencies with the Carnes' declaration (including the
   fact that the substance of this declaration apparently was not disclosed in
   accordance with rules governing pre-trial discovery), the opinions stated
   therein are vague and conclusory and, as in Angle, do not suffice to
   overcome plaintiff's failure of proof on her claim of outrage. Cf
   Crenshaw V. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 915 F.Supp. 93, 99 (W.D.Ark.
   1995) (affidavit prepared after opposing motion for summary judgment
   filed detailing symptoms of weight loss, lack of sleep, headache, worry,
   and nausea, failed to present sufficient evidence of emotional distress).

   In sum, plaintiff's allegations fall far short of the rigorous standards for
   establishing a claim of outrage under Arkansas law and the Court
   therefore grants the President's motion for summary judgment on this
   claim.

                          III.

   One final matter concerns alleged suppression of pattern and practice
   evidence. Whatever relevance such evidence may have to prove other
   elements of plaintiff's case, it does not have anything to do with the
   issues presented by the President's and Ferguson's motions for summary
   judgment, i.e., whether plaintiff herself was the victim Of alleged quid
   pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment, whether the
   President and Ferguson conspired to deprive her of her civil rights, or
   whether she suffered emotional distress so severe in nature that no
   reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Whether other women
   may have been subjected, to workplace harassment, and whether such
   evidence has allegedly been suppressed, does not change the fact that
   plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she has a case worthy of
   submitting to a jury. Reduced to its essence, the record taken as a whole
   could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party and
   the Court therefore finds that there are no genuine issues for trial in this
   case.

                          IV.

   For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the President's and
   Ferguson's motions for summary judgment should both be and hereby
   are granted. There being no remaining issues, the Court will enter
   judgment dismissing this case.

   IT IS SO ORDERED this 1st day of April 1998.

   /s/ Susan Webber Wright
   UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
 

   ENDNOTES

   1Among other things, the Court allowed plaintiff to drop her defamation
   claim against Ferguson and allowed her to drop her remaining
   loss-of-reputation claims. The Court also allowed plaintiff to clarify her
   constitutional and civil rights claims and conform them more fully to the
   facts previously pled, but only to the extent that plaintiff was not thereby
   asserting new causes of action or attempting to add Ferguson as a
   defendant on any cause of action where he was not previously
   considered a defendant.

   2 All other pending motions in this case, including the motion filed on
   Saturday, March 28, 1998, in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, have no bearing on
   the issues raised by the President's and Ferguson's motions for summary
   judgment and are therefore not addressed.

   3In addressing the issues in this cast, the Court has viewed the record in
   the light most favorable to plaintiff and given her the benefit of all
   reasonable factual inferences, which is required at this stage of the
   proceedings. See Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotel, -F.3d-, 1998 WL
   92202, *1(8th Cir. March 5, 1998). The Court has, however, deemed
   admitted those facts set forth by the President in his statement of
   material facts that plaintiff has not specifically controverted in her
   statement of material facts. See Rule 56.1(c) of the Rules of the United
   State District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas,
   which provides that "[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement filed by
   the moving party ... shall be deemed admitted unless controverted by the
   statement filed by the non-moving party...."

   4Ferguson states that plaintiff informed him that she would like to meet
   the Governor, remarking that she thought the Governor "was
   good-looking [and] had sexy hair," Ferguson Depo. at 50, while plaintiff
   states that Ferguson asked her if she would like to meet the Governor
   and that she was "excited" about the possibility, Pl.'s Depo. at 101.

   5In her amended complaint, plaintiff states that the Governor "put his
   hand on [her] leg and started sliding it toward the hem of [her] culottes,
   apparently attempting to reach [her] pelvic area " Am. Compl. Paragraph
   20. In her original complaint, plaintiff states that the Governor "put his
   hand an [her] leg and started sliding it toward the hem of [her] culottes,"
   with no reference to her "pelvic area." Compl. Paragraph 20.

   6Plaintiff states in her amended complaint that the Governor "asked" her
   to "kiss it" rather than telling her to do so. Am. Compl. Paragraph 21.
   She states in her deposition that the Governor's specific words to her
   were, "Would you kiss it for me?" Pl.'s Depo. at 108.

   7Plaintiff's allegation that Governor momentarily "detained" her was not
   included in either her original or amended complaint.

   8These provisions state that an "offense of sexual assault" includes a
   crime under the law of a state that involved "contact, without consent,
   between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or
   anus of another person," "contact, without consent, between the genitals
   or anus of the defendant and any part of another person's body," or "an
   attempt or conspiracy to engage in" such conduct.

   9Under Ark. Code Ann. Section 5-14-108(a)(1), a person commits
   sexual abuse in the first degree if "[h]e engages in sexual contact with
   another person by forcible compulsion."

   10Plaintiff also cites West v. State, 719 S.W.2d 684 (Ark. 1986), as
   authority for her claim of criminal sexual assault. Plaintiffs reliance on
   West is misplaced as the defendant in that can "came up behind" the
   15-year-old victim, "put his arms around her, put his hand over her left
   breast [cupping her breast firmly and squeezing it], and kissed the back
   of her neck." Id. at 686. The facts alleged by plaintiff in this case bear
   no material resemblance to those that were at issue in West and do not
   give rise to a claim of criminal sexual assault.

   11This is not to say that the standards under both Section 1983 and Title
   VII are exactly the same. Among other things, a plaintiff under Section
   1983 must demonstrate that the defendant was acting under color of
   state law while Title VII requires no such showing. Thus, contrary to
   plaintiff's suggestion that her burden of proof under Section 1983 is
   something less than what would be required of her under Title VII, a
   plaintiff's burden under Section 1983 exceeds that under Title VII in
   most cases. See, eg., Guy v. State of Illinois, 958 F.Supp. 1300, 1307
   (N.D.Ill. 1997). Here, however, the President is not at this time
   contesting the issues of whether he acted under color of state law with
   the intent to discriminate against plaintiffs on the basis of her gender.

   12Plaintiff's contention that she is not required to show a tangible job
   detriment is at odds with her representation made in her opposition to the
   President's motion for judgment on the pleadings (filed July 29, 1997),
   that sexual harassment occurs when, among other things, "rejection of
   such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
   decisions." See Pl. Opp'n to Mot. for J. on the Pleadings at 26 (citing
   Tide VII cases and guidelines promulgated by the EEOC). Indeed, the
   primary basis of plaintiff's original and amended complaint is her
   contention that she suffered reprisals for her rejection of the Governor's
   alleged advances.

   13For this reason, had plaintiff demonstrated adverse employment action,
   which she has not, the Court would not find the Governor's alleged
   statements to be sufficient evidence of a causal link between that harm
   and any alleged quid pro quo demands. Cf. Cram, 49 F.3d at 474
   (statement by harasser that, "I'll get you for this," held to be insufficient
   to show enforcement of quid pro quo demand where there was no
   reference to plaintiff's job); Hartleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767,
   775-76 (6th Cir. 1996) (statement from harasser that he was "close
   friends" with individual who had impact on claimed adverse employment
   decisions held to be too attenuated to establish causation).

   14Of course, it remains to be seen whether the holding of Jansen will
   survive review by the Supreme Court.

   15Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating "against any
   individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment" on the basis of sex, or from limiting,
   segregating, or classifying employees on the basis of sex "in any way
   which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
   opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee...."
   42 U.S.C. Section 20OOe-2(a)(l)-(2). The concept of "tangible job
   detriment" as used in quid pro quo cases and the concept of "adverse
   employment action" as used in retaliation cases both derive from the
   basic prohibition of employment discrimination set forth in Section
   200Oe-2(a)(l)-(2), see Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d
   686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997), and thus correspond to one another. See
   Sanders, 134 F.3d at 339; Bryson v. Chicago State Univ., 96 F.3d 912,
   916 (7th Cir. 1996); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414
   (10th Cir, 1987). Accordingly, this court has looked to cases discussing
   both concepts in addressing the issues in this case.

   16Plaintiff originally claimed that the job in which she was placed called
   for a higher grade and pay, but that she was not paid more money than
   she received in her previous position and never received a raise beyond a
   cost of living increase, even though other employees received merit
   increases. Am. Compl. Paragraph 39. That claim apparently has been
   abandoned as it is not mentioned in plaintiff's response to the President's
   motion for summary judgment. The Court notes that plaintiff apparently
   never reviewed her employment records at AIDC prior to filing suit in
   May 1994 and had not done so prior to her deposition. Pl.'s Depo. at 33,
   76.

   17Plaintiff offers no evidence that her previous position conferred some
   type of status or prestige not conferred in her subsequent position, and
   she offers no evidence that the change in her duties impaired her ability
   to advance in her career.

   18Plaintiff states "there was a lot of hostility it seemed like between
   Cherry Durkett and I," and that Pennington was "not as friendly as she
   used to have been." Pl.'s Depo. at 35, 45.

   19Plaintiff makes this allegation even though she testified that following
   her return from maternity leave, she input data pursuant to her new
   responsibilities "all day long." Pl.'s Depo. at 56.

   20Under Arkansas law, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
   distress and the tort of outrage are essentially the same causes of action
   and are governed by the same standards. See, e.g. Hamaker v. Ivy, 51
   F.3d 108, 110 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995), Ross v. Patterson, 817 S.W.2d
   418,420 (Ark. 1991).

   21In denying the President's motion for judgment on the pleadings on
   this claim, the Court noted that the totality of the alleged conduct on
   which plaintiff based her lawsuit, including her claim that her rejection of
   the President's alleged advances caused her to suffer adverse
   employment actions, could, if true, be regarded as sufficient to state a
   claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Jones, 974
   F.Supp. at 730. For the reasons previously stated, however, it is now
   apparent that plaintiff's claims have not borne fruit. The record upon
   which this Court is now addressing plaintiff's claim of outrage - indeed,
   all her claims - is far different from the record that was before the Court
   last August.

SOURCE: http://www.courttv.com/legaldocs/government/jones/ruling.html