I.       Are the Hatfields entitled to a permanent injunction? 

          One basic requirement for obtaining any permanent remedy is that you must have won your case on the merits.  Here, the judge has already granted ruled that the dogs are a nuisance, so this requirement is met.

          Inadequate remedy at law.  As to the injunction itself, the first requirement is that there must not be an adequate remedy at law.  In deciding this issue, one consideration is that the requested injunction involves the use of land.  Courts often grant injunctions to protect this interest, because land is unique.  As we saw in Boomer, some jurisdictions (at least in the past) automatically granted an injunction against a nuisance.  Here, the injunction is not automatic, but the fact that the nuisance disturbs the Hatfield’s use and enjoyment of their land weighs in favor of finding the legal remedy inadequate.

          Another factor is multiplicity of lawsuits.  Because the statute of limitations is two years, if the Hatfields are limited to damages they will have to file a new lawsuit every few years. 

          A related consideration is whether there will be recurrent invasions of the plaintiff’s interests.  It seems likely that if the McCoys make enough money from their enterprise, they will simply pay $5000 per year in damages as a cost of doing business and continue to raise lots of dogs on their property.

          One more factor that weighs in favor of finding no adequate legal remedy is the difficulty of measuring damages in monetary terms.  The McCoys will argue that the judge has set past damages at $5000 per year, but the fact is that putting a dollar figure on the annoyance, lost sleep, and other consequences of this nuisance is inherently very difficult. 

          In summary, money damages do not seem adequate, nor does there seem to be any other legal remedy, such as a type of legal restitution, that might be adequate.  This requirement is clearly met.

          Irreparable harm.   A second requirement is that the plaintiff must suffer irreparable harm.  This does not literally mean that the harm cannot be repaired (as we saw in the Muhlman case), but that the injury be great or substantial.  Having some peace and quiet at home and getting a good night’s sleep are hardly trivial to most people, so the nuisance is definitely leading to great or substantial harm.

          Balancing the equities.  Courts also require that the benefit of an injunction to the plaintiff outweigh the burden that it places on the defendant.  The benefit to the Hatfields here is great, as we have already discussed (being able to enjoy their home and land, a good night’s sleep, etc.). 

          But an injunction against raising any dogs at all would place a substantial burden on the McCoys.  They would either have to stop raising dogs and find another line of work, or spend an undetermined amount of money moving their business to a more appropriate location.  They have also spent money adding buildings to their property, and it’s not clear that they would recover this money if forced to sell and move elsewhere, since the average homeowner does not need a large dog kennel. 

          The public interest in creating jobs might also be a factor here (see Boomer), since the McCoys have three employees who would lose their jobs if the business is shut down.  On the other hand, if the McCoys are able to move to another location, those jobs would not be lost.  In addition, three jobs is not that many, and unlike making cement, there is no public interest in raising dangerous dogs.

          If a complete injunction against raising any dogs at all would not pass balancing, courts may modify a requested injunction and rebalance.  For example, in the Onassis case the court held that an injunction preventing the photographer from taking any pictures of Jackie at all would destroy his livelihood, but a less stringent injunction passed the balancing test.  Here, an injunction against commercial dog raising (allowing a few for pleasure), or limiting the business to a few dogs at a time, would clearly pass the balancing test.

          Conclusion.  A judge will grant either the requested injunction, or a somewhat more limited injunction as outlined above.

 

2.       Do the McCoys have any defenses to an injunction?

          An injunction is an equitable remedy, so only equitable defenses will apply.  Two that might apply on these facts are unclean hands and laches.

          Unclean hands.  One possible defense that the Hatfields, by engaging in loud parties twice a year, have themselves engaged in a nuisance and therefore have unclean hands.  This defense requires (1) serious misconduct by the plaintiff (usually fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable acts) and (2) the conduct must be related to the underlying action.  As to (1), the misconduct here is not all that serious, and any nuisance that the Hatfields cause is clearly far less serious than that caused by the McCoys.  Even more problematic is that there is no real relationship between the Hatfield’s misconduct and the requested injunction.  Unlike the logging case that we read, a court issuing this injunction would not be encouraging or promoting the misconduct.  In other words, the court will not “dirty” its hands in granting this injunction.  So unclean hands is not a defense.

          Laches.  Another equitable defense is laches.  It requires unreasonable delay and prejudice to the defendant.  Here, the Hatfields did indeed delay for some time. The McCoys acquired more dogs in 2000 and physically expanded the business in 2001.  The Hatfields did not sue until 2004.  In addition, many courts presume delay if the relevant statute of limitations is past (2 years for nuisance), and the Hatfields might find it difficult to rebut this presumption.

          The tricky question is whether the McCoys were prejudiced by this delay.  One kind of prejudice is defense prejudice, but there is no evidence here to support it.  The other is economic prejudice.  The McCoys might argue that they will have to pay more in damages (for past nuisances) because of the delay in suing.  And if the Hatfields had sued earlier, they might not have spent all that money building on their land.  On the other hand, since the McCoys were making money during this time, they probably benefited from the fact that the Hatfields did not immediately seek an injunction.  So whether there was prejudice, and whether laches applies, is a hard issue—probably a toss-up.

          Another possible equitable remedy is estoppel.  This usually involves a party taking a position, and intending that the other party rely on that position.  It seems like a stretch to say the Hatfields, by doing nothing, took the position that it was fine for the McCoys to engage in a nuisance, and even more of a stretch to suggest they intended the Hatfields to rely, or perhaps knew they would be likely to rely.

          Election of remedies also does not seem to apply.  There is nothing inconsistent in getting damages for past injury and an injunction against future nuisance.

          Most likely, the Hatfields will obtain a modified injunction limiting the number of dogs that the McCoys can keep on their property.